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For over a century, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or the
Agency) and its precursors have regulated what companies say about their
products.' The FDA itself notes that the regulatory scheme imposed by the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act "depends on the use of words" and that
its requirements can "explicitly limit speech."' For seventy years, the FDA had
little reason to worry about First Amendment constraints. But since 1976,
when the Supreme Court reversed its longstanding position that the First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech,' the Agency has had to
confront-perhaps more than any other federal agency-the free speech rights
of regulated firms.
But how far do those rights extend, and what room do they leave for
regulators like the FDA? The answer largely depends on another question: Is
the speech commercial or noncommercial? The distinction is paramount. If
speech by a regulated firm is commercial, then the FDA can ensure that it is
not false or misleading; the Agency can require or compel certain speech; it
can impose prior restraints; and it can even limit truthful speech, all within
certain parameters.' But if the speech is noncommercial, the FDA may not do
many-if any-of these things. The distinction thus determines the extent to
which the government can regulate, if at all.
Unfortunately, after three decades of experience with commercial speech,
the doctrinal distinctions between commercial and noncommercial speech
remain marbled with points of confusion and contention. The prevailing test
from Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products asks whether the speech is an
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' Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (prohibiting
'misbranding").
2 Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942, 34,943 (May
13, 2002).
3 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976).
4 Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-
Commercial Speech?, 39 ColN. L. REv. 379, 386-87 (2006) (contrasting cases of commercial
and noncommercial speech).
CAN SPEECH BY FDA-REGULATED FIRMS EVER BE
NONCOMMERCIAL? 389
advertisement, whether it refers to a specific product, and whether the
speaker has an economic motive,' thus considering the form, content, and
motivation for the speech. This test capably distinguishes paradigmatic
examples of commercial and noncommercial speech. But it is unsatisfactory
when categorizing less traditional or even mixed speech, thereby leaving lower
courts, regulators, and regulated parties alike with significant uncertainty as
to the permissible bounds of regulation.
A point of lingering uncertainty is under what circumstances speech by
corporations might qualify for heightened protection as noncommercial. In
2003, the Supreme Court declined to hear Nike v. Kasky, passing on a chance
to provide much-anticipated guidance.' Before then, the Court established
that direct comments on public issues deserve heightened protection,
regardless of who is speaking.' But what about other forms of corporate
speech? Can speech by regulated firms ever be noncommercial? If so, when?
These are not minor questions for agencies like the FDA that confront
myriad forms of speech that are not easily categorized. Marketers of food,
drugs, devices, and dietary supplements often speak in ways that disrupt our
conventional understanding of what constitutes advertising or promotion. Not
only have these companies pioneered the creative use of press releases, web
sites, social media, and other formats, but they also speak through
intermediaries and third parties-particularly scientific and medical experts-
using speakers bureaus, continuing medical education (CME) seminars,
industry and academic conferences, and reprints of scientific studies and
academic articles.' Are these forms of speech always commercial? What would
it take to qualify for heightened protection?
To better answer these questions, this Article offers a framework that
identifies the indicia of commercial speech-the relevant factors courts can
use to distinguish commercial from noncommercial speech. Relying on both
Supreme Court decisions and a systematic review of cases in which FDA-
regulated firms claimed First Amendment protection, I propose a more
reductionist, disaggregated approach than the three-part test in Bolger. Bolger
considers the form, content and motivation for the speech. I argue that courts
should recognize that they are really considering the Who, What, When,
Where, Why, and How of the speech at issue: Who is speaking? What is the
content of the speech? When is the speech communicated? Where is the
speech directed? Why is the speaker speaking? And how is the speech
communicated? These questions provide a more complete, detailed picture of
' Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
'See Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
7 See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). As Justice Kennedy recently emphasized
in his majority opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the First
Amendment generally prohibits "restrictions distinguishing among different speakers."
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). But, cf 130 S. Ct. at 949
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority "dramatically overstates its critique of
identity-based distinctions").
' Indeed, Bill Vodra, a longtime food and drug lawyer and former attorney in FDA's Office
of Chief Counsel, made a similar observation over twenty years ago. William W. Vodra, How
the FDA Regulates Drug Promotion and Medical Education Before Drug Approval, 23 DRUG
INFO. J. 585, 586 (1989) (noting that "promotional technologies and strategies for marketing
drugs have expanded and evolved with unpredicted speed and diversity over the last 10 years").
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the speech. And courts should acknowledge these factors and understand how
they operate.
The Article evaluates how courts have applied these factors and offers a
few observations. First, when courts apply the three factors from Bolger, the
distinction often boils down to why the speaker is speaking-whether the
speech is economically motivated. Despite claims that the Supreme Court is
careful not to rest the distinction on commercial intent, which it considers
almost "forbidden territory,"9 most of the factors indeed look for evidence of
commercial intent. As emphasized below, commercial intent can become
evident by carefully examining who is speaking, about what, when, where,
why, and how. Why the speaker is speaking is the most salient factor, but
perhaps the most difficult to reliably ascertain.
Second, courts frequently rely on who is speaking as a proxy for
determining the speaker's motivations, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
repeated declarations that not all speech by corporations is necessarily
commercial. My review found that out of twenty-four cases in which FDA-
regulated firms claimed First Amendment protection, courts categorized the
speech as commercial in all but two, neither of which involved FDA rules or
enforcement."o The case law suggests that courts have developed more than a
healthy dose of skepticism regarding speech by FDA-regulated firms,
particularly pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers." I consider
several types of distinction-blurring speech by these firms-including
statements made via press releases and other forms of publicity, speech
associated with charitable programs, and speech about off-label uses for FDA-
approved products-and conclude that each of the factors would have to align
perfectly for a skeptical court to categorize the speech as noncommercial.
Thus, the answer to the question in the title (Can speech by FDA-regulated
firms ever be noncommercial?) is yes, but only if the stars align.
II. WHY THE DISTINCTION MATTERS
The government enjoys much more latitude to regulate commercial than
noncommercial speech. When the speech is commercial, the government can
more easily prohibit false or misleading speech, compel speech, impose prior
restraints on it, and even limit truthful speech-all of which are extremely
problematic in noncommercial contexts.'" For the FDA's purposes, this
essentially means the difference between being able to regulate or not.
The disparity largely derives from the different tests courts apply. For laws
targeting commercial speech, courts apply intermediate scrutiny under the
famous four-part test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
9Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, ho's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627,
640 (1990).
10 See infra Tbl. 1: Cases in Which FDA-Regulated Firms Claimed First Amendment
Protection.
" And for good reason. Bill Vodra notes that "[t]he FDA would probably agree that the
pharmaceutical industry has not acted as though it is severely constrained in its advertising
and promotion." Vodra, supra note 8, at 587.
" Bennigson, supra note 4, at 386-87 (contrasting cases between commercial and
noncommercial speech).
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Commission." The test asks: (i) whether the speech is inherently false or
misleading, and if not, continues on to ask; (ii) whether the government
asserts a substantial interest; (iii) whether the restriction directly advances
that interest; and (iv) whether there is a reasonable fit between the
government's ends and the means it uses."
By contrast, laws targeting noncommercial speech receive more stringent
scrutiny. When the government wants to regulate noncommercial speech
directly, it must demonstrate that it has a compelling interest, and that the
restriction directly advances that interest using the least restrictive means
available." Even content neutral regulations that indirectly affect
noncommercial speech must further an important governmental interest that
is unrelated to suppressing free expression, and restrict no more speech than
necessary."
The first factor in Central Hudson is crucial, as it recognizes the
government's authority to ask whether the content of commercial speech is
false or misleading-a query generally forbidden in noncommercial contexts,
where restrictions must be content neutral, regardless of the truth or falsity of
the speech. 7 Thus, for example, regulators like the FDA can scrutinize the
content of a manufacturer's labeling or advertising to determine whether, in
the Agency's opinion, it is false or misleading. Noncommercial speech is
largely immune from such content-based objections.
The last factor in both the commercial and noncommercial tests look the
same, and both essentially ask whether the speech restriction is more
burdensome than necessary." But courts apply this criterion much differently
depending on whether the speech is commercial or not, tolerating
considerably greater burdens on commercial speech.19 Thus, the distinction
largely determines whether, and to what extent, the government can regulate.
Nevertheless, characterizing the speech as commercial does not
necessarily mean that courts will uphold restrictions on it.20 Courts have not
hesitated to invalidate such restrictions under Central Hudson, and the
Supreme Court has chastised the government for "seriously
underestimatEing] the value of commercial speech."21
Even so, as FDA-regulated firms devise more novel and creative ways to
promote their products, regulators might be guided by Justice Brennan's
warning that "those who seek to convey commercial messages will engage in
the most imaginative of exercises to place themselves within the safe haven of
noncommercial speech, while at the same time conveying their commercial
a Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
4 Id.
15 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70 (1997).
16 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
1 See Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 615 (1994).
"s The Court characterizes the fourth Central Hudson criterion this way. 447 U.S. at 566.
- Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV.
55, 65 (1999).
20 Id. at 95.
21 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993).
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message."22 As I demonstrate in Part IV, courts seem to have adopted this
skepticism towards FDA-regulated firms.
III. HOW THE DISTINCTION EVOLVED
The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech first
emerged in 1942, when the Supreme Court rejected a transparent attempt to
add political objections to an advertisement and use the First Amendment to
shield it from regulation.23 In a "casual, almost offhand" ruling, the Court
held that the First Amendment does not cover "purely commercial
advertising,"" without elaborating what this meant. So, as the story goes, "the
Supreme Court plucked the commercial speech doctrine out of thin air.""
Although this holding lingered for over three decades, the Court seemed
to recognize much earlier that commercial speech deserved at least some
protection. And with it sprouted the need to define commercial speech with
more granularity. When the Supreme Court finally held that the First
Amendment protects commercial speech in the mid 1970s,28 it explained in a
footnote that "commonsense differences" could distinguish commercial from
noncommercial varieties.29 Initially, this meant speech that "does no more
than propose a commercial transaction.""
But instead of sketching out boundaries for tougher cases, the Court was
more comfortable speaking about paradigmatic examples, particularly things
that clearly were not commercial speech." For example, in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, the Court explained that pure, noncommercial speech is
concerned with the "exposition of ideas" about "truth, science, morality, and
arts in general," including liberal sentiments on the administration of
Government."3 2 In doing so, the Court contrasted such speech with price
advertising for prescription drugs at issue in the case. Therefore, the early
22 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 540 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
23 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). In Valentine, an entrepreneur
tried to evade New York City's Sanitary Code prohibition on distributing commercial handbills
in public by printing on the opposite side of his advertisement a statement opposing the City
Dock Department's decision to deny him a permit. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 9, at
627-28.
24 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
25 Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54.
26 Kozinski & Banner, supra note 9, at 627.
27 Id. at 629 (reciting concurring and dissenting opinions as early as 1959 questioning the
holding in Chrestensen in 1942).
" The Court's decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) formally applied the First Amendment to
commercial speech, striking down a state statute prohibiting advertising of prescription drug
prices. But the previous term, in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), the Court struck
down a state statute banning newspaper advertisement for abortion procedures, noting that
courts must account for First Amendment interests in reviewing regulation of commercial
advertising.
29 Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-62, 771-72 n.24.
30 Id. at 771-72 n.24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
" Kozinski & Banner, supra note 9, at 638.
22 Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
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cases intuited distinctions between traditional advertising on one hand and
romanticized notions of pure speech on the other. But these cases were not
equipped to do much else.
Of course, between these two easily identifiable poles resides a great
swath of speech that is neither purely commercial nor noncommercial. And
eventually litigants would ask the Supreme Court to categorize speech that did
not rest comfortably on either end. Indeed, the Court foreshadowed this
problem in Virginia State Board ofPharmacy, noting that commercial speech
is not "wholly undifferentiable from other forms."" But the Court's 1980
opinion in Central Hudson simply explained that commercial speech is any
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience."" This definition also seemed too tautological.
The Court recognized that it would need to formulate a test for the
tougher cases. Three years later, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, the Court
broadened its analysis into an implied totality of the circumstances test,
asking whether the speech is an advertisement, whether it refers to a specific
product, and whether the speaker has an economic motive." Though none of
these factors alone could render the speech "commercial," together they
could." The Court thus gradually shifted from "commonsense" distinctions
that could differentiate only classic cases of paradigmatically commercial or
noncommercial speech to a series of factors that could handle more difficult
ones.
Yet even the more modern test in Bolger is marbled with points of
confusion and contention. Summarizing the criticisms, one scholar found that
"the Bolger test has attracted scant endorsement among commentators" who
call it "perplexing," "unworkable," and other unflattering things. 7 To some,
even the basic distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
"makes no sense."" Justice Thomas would virtually obliterate it.39 Others
argue that it is impossible to categorically distinguish commercial from
noncommercial speech in any satisfactory way,"o as many cases simply do not
reflect "a clean distinction between the market for ideas and the market for
goods and services."" Still others maintain that commercial speech should not
be protected by the First Amendment at all because it does not further any of
the First Amendment's underlying goals or rationales.4 2 Finally, in the middle,
dozens of scholars have argued for altering or refining the distinction in
various ways, 3 as I do here.
" Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
3 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
" Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
3 Id. at 67.
3 Stern, supra note 19, at 86.
" Kozinski & Banner, supra note 9, at 628.
39 See Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518, 526-28 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
4 Stern, supra note 19, at 75-77 (summarizing others' arguments on this point).
41 Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
41 See, e.g., Bennigson, supra note 4, at 397; see generally Stern, supra note 19, at 73-75.
41 See Stern, supra note 19, at 77-79
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court recently declined an opportunity to
clarify the distinction in Nike v. Kasky." In the late 1990s, Nike defended its
overseas labor practices against charges that it was underpaying and
mistreating foreign workers by using a public relations campaign that
included letters to newspaper editors and university administrators, press
releases, and other non-advertising documents." After a consumer sued Nike
under California's unfair competition laws46 for making false and misleading
statements, the California Supreme Court held that Nike's speech was
commercial "[b]ecause the mcssages in question were directed by a
commercial speaker to a commercial audience, and because they made
representations of fact about the speaker's own business operations for the
purpose of promoting sales of its products." 7
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari after originally
granting it," passing up the opportunity to clarify whether Nike's speech was
commercial or not. Justice Breyer's dissent argued that although a commercial
speaker was addressing its business practices to a commercial audience, the
form, content, and regulatory context were all noncommercial, pointing
towards heightened protection.4 9 The dismissal surprised those who predicted
that the Court would declare Nike's speech to be noncommercial.so Given the
Roberts Court's current composition and its aggressive stance towards First
Amendment rights, one could certainly envision a different outcome today.
IV. A SURVEY OF THE DISTINCTION IN FDA-RELATED CASES
How have courts made the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech in FDA-related cases? My research found twenty-four
cases since the 1976 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy opinion in which an
FDA-regulated firm argued that its speech was protected by the First
Amendment." Of these, seven involved FDA-regulated firms but did not
" Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 533 U.S. 654 (2003).
6 Id. at 672 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46 See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§§ 17200-17364,17500 (West 1997).
47 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (2002).
" Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 533 U.S. 654 (2003).
4 Id. at 676-79 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk,
What Is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1143 (2003-04) (persuasively arguing that Nike's speech was noncommercial).
50 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Nike and the Free-Speech Knot, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2003, at
A16.
s' Note that I include recent litigation over state prescription confidentiality laws in
Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine that limit the use and dissemination of prescriber data
captured by data mining companies. Although the primary plaintiffs are data mining
companies like IMS Health, which themselves are not regulated by the FDA, the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) is also a party to some of
the litigation, or filed amicus briefs siding with the data mining companies. Note also that I do
not include the much-watched case Allergan v. FDA, in which the biotech manufacturer
challenged FDA's Good Reprint Practices Guidance, see infra note 217, arguing that any
restrictions on discussing off-label uses of approved drugs are unconstitutional if the speech is
truthful and not misleading, and if such off-label uses are "widely accepted" and are
reimbursed by government programs like Medicare. Complaint at 28-35, Allergan, Inc. v.
FDA, No. 1:09-CV-01879 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2009). For a discussion of this case, see Osborn, infra
note 216, at 338-39. Allergan agreed to drop its suit against the FDA in September 2010 as
part of a settlement with the government in which Allergan paid $600 million in civil and
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involve FDA rules or enforcement-three alleging unfair competition under
the Lanham Act,52 three challenging state prescription confidentiality laws,
and one involving product liability claims." I include these cases because they
generally involve FDA-regulated firms invoking First Amendment defenses of
their speech. The Table below identifies the speech at issue in each case, and
whether the court deemed it to be commercial or not. I analyze these cases
below.
TABLE: CASES IN WHICH FDA-REGULATED FIRMS CLAIMED FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Alliance for Natural Health v. Health claims on
1 Sebelius, 2010 WL 2110071 dietary supplement labeling.
(D.D.C. May 27, 2010)
Commonwealth Brands v. Claims about
2 United States, 2009 WL "modified risk tobacco products"
3754273 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 5, made on the label, in the labeling or
2009) advertising, or "directed to
consumers through the media or
otherwise."
United States v. Harkonen, Various types of
3 2009 WL 1578712 (N.D. Cal. speech discussing the results of a
June 4, 2009) clinical trial, including a press
release sent to thousands of
potential prescribers.
United States v. Caputo, 517 Various types of
4 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2008) promotion for medical devices.
United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Various marketing
5 Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) materials by a sales representative.
Wallach v. Crawford, 2005 WL Package including a
criminal fines for promoting Botox off-label. Dep't of Justice, Allergan Agrees to Plead Guilty
and Pay $600 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-988.html;
Allergan, Allergan Resolves United States Government Investigation of Past Sales and
Marketing Practices Relating to Certain Therapeutic Uses of Botox, ALLERGAN (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://agn.client.shareholder.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=503974.
52 See Beharry v. Bedessee Imports Inc., No. 09-CV-0077, 2010 WL 1223590 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 23, 2010) (alleging that a newspaper article describing FDA enforcement actions against
a food importer and a competitor subsequently emailing the article to potential clients violated
the Lanham Act); Bracco Diagnostics v. Amersham Health, 627 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D.N.J. 2009)
(alleging that peer-reviewed scientific journal articles and various print media and oral
communications referring to the articles violated the Lanham Act); In re Warfarin Sodium
Antitrust Litig, No. MDL 98-1232-SLR, 1998 WL 883469 (D. Del. Dec. 7, 1998) (alleging that
computer software, press release, and more traditional written materials used by DuPont
Merck violated the Lanham Act).
s3 See IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2010) (challenging state statute
limiting the use and dissemination of prescriber data captured by data mining companies);
IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010) (same); IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550
F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) (same).
" See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1014, 1997 WL 186325
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) (examining speeches and presentations in seminars and other venues).
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6 6054963 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, cover letter, a reprint of chapter in
2005) Physician's Desk Reference, and a
list of products and prices.
Whitaker v. Thompson, 239 F. Health claims made
7 Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2003) on dietary supplement labeling.
Thompson v. W. States Med. Advertising and
8 Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) promotion for drugs compounded
by pharmacists.
Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, Reprints of medical
9 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000); textbooks and peer-reviewed
Wash. Legal Found. v. journal articles, and CME seminars.
Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51
(D.D.C. 1998)
Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 Health claims on
10 (D.C. Cir. 1999) dietary supplement labeling.
Wellife Prods. v. Shalala, 52 Health claims on
11 F.3d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1995) dietary supplement labeling.
Nutritional Health Alliance v. Health claims on
12 Shalala, 953 F. Supp. 526 dietary supplement labeling.
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)
Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, "Enduring
13 880 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1995) materials" (such as medical
journals, articles, and textbooks),
and scientific or educational
activities and symposia."6
Mineral Res. Intl v. Shalala, 53 Health claims,
14 F.3d 305 (10th Cir. 1995) nutrient content information, and
nutrient labeling for foods and
dietary supplements.
Nat'l Council for Improved Health claims on
15 Health v. Shalala, 893 F. Supp. dietary supplement labeling.
1512 (D. Utah 1995)
United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Marketing materials
16 638 F. Supp. 556 (W.D.N.Y. for dietary supplement.
1986)
United States v. Undetermined Self-hypnosis
17 Quantities of Article of Device, tape recordings making claims to
Med. Devices Rep. (CCH) T treat various diseases and ailments.
15,055 (W.D. Mich. 1982)
18 Beharry v. Bedessee Imports, Newspaper
2010 WL 1223590 (E.D.N.Y. article describing FDA enforcement
Mar. 23, 2010) against food manufacturer, and
s' Although the court in Kessler cited Virginia Board of Pharmacy as giving rise to a
cognizable First Amendment right for standing purposes, the court did not determine whether
the Washington Legal Foundations's physician members right to receive information from
drug manufacturers deserved heightened protection or not. Wash. Legal Found. V. Kessler,
880 F. Supp. 26, 31 (D.D.C. 1995). The court did not cite either Bolger or Central Hudson.
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emails from competitor to
customers attaching the article and
offering to discuss it.
19 Bracco Diagnostics v. Scientific articles
Amersham Health, 627 F. Supp. published in peer-reviewed
2d 384 (D.N.J. 2009) academic journals.
Brochures, web sites,
presentations, and CME seminars
referring to the article.
20 In re Warfarin Sodium Press releases,
Antitrust Litig., 1998 WL computer software for prescribers,
883469 (D. Del. Dec. 7, 1998) letters, faxes, slide presentations,
and other forms.
21 IMS Health v. Sorrell, 2010 WL Gathering,
4723183 (2d Cir. 2010); 631 F. disseminating, and using prescriber
Supp. 2d 434 (D. Vt. 2009) data captured by data mining
companies (Vermont law).
22 IMS Health v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d Gathering,
42 (1st Cir. 2008); 490 F. Supp. disseminating, and using prescriber
2d 163 (D.N.H. 2007) data captured by data mining
companies (New Hampshire law).
23 IMS Health v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7 : Gathering,
(1st Cir. 2010); IMS Health v. disseminating, and using prescriber
Rowe, 552 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. data captured by data mining
Me. 2007) companies (Maine law).
24 In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Seminars for
Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781 physicians discussing devices,
(3d Cir. 1999); 1997 WL 186325 delivered by spinal surgeons and
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) other health care professionals, and
by professional associations.
Of these twenty-four cases, only two held that the speech was
noncommercial, both of which were Lanham Act cases." Of the seventeen
FDA-related cases, no court found the speech to be noncommercial,
supporting the observation that "every major lawsuit challenging FDA speech
restrictions has proceeded under the assumption that the speech in question
is commercial in character." 7 However, of these seventeen cases, three courts
did not categorize the speech."
56 See Beharry, 2010 WL 1223590, at *8; Bracco Diagnostics, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 456.
7 Richard A. Samp, Courts Are Arriving at a Consensus on Food and Drug
Administration Speech Regulation, 58 FooD & DRUG L.J. 313, 314; See, e.g., Thompson v. W.
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
5 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 31 (D.D.C. 1995) (citing Va. Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 728, but only for the standing question, not on the question of whether
the speech is commercial or not); Mineral Res. Int'l v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
53 F.3d 305 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that court lacked jurisdiction and thus not considering
First Amendment claims); United States v. Undetermined Quantities of Article of Device,
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Of the remaining fourteen FDA-related cases in which the court
affirmatively found the speech to be commercial, nine did so without really
applying (and sometimes without even citing) the Bolger test, for example by
jumping straight into Central Hudson. 9 Granted, five of these nine involved
statements in the label or labeling of FDA-regulated products, which most
parties concede are properly categorized as commercial.o And some clearly
involved commercial advertising or marketing, in which case the parties often
did not even contend that the speech was noncommercial."
Only a handful are what could be considered difficult cases, supporting
Nat Stern's observation that most commercial expression is clear-cut.62
Perhaps the most well-considered opinion was penned by Judge Lamberth in
WLF v. Friedman. There, the court considered First Amendment challenges
to three FDA guidance documents addressing manufacturer use of article
reprints, medical textbooks, and CME seminars that discuss off-label uses of
FDA-approved products.63 The court noted that reprints, reference texts, and
CME seminars are not "typical" commercial speech because "the speech that
manufacturers wish to communicate is the speech of others-the work
product of scientists, physicians, and other academics."" But in applying the
three-part Bolger test, the court found that: (i) "these activities are
advertisements" because they "emphasize a desirable quality" about the
product "in hopes that the physician will prescribe . . . the drug;" (ii) the
speech refers to a specific product; and (iii) manufacturers "clearly have an
economic motive" because these activities are shown to increase sales.6
Hence, even in an ostensibly difficult case involving mixed, scientific speech,
the court had no trouble categorizing it as commercial.
Med. Devices Rep., PETER B. HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD &
DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 71 (3rd ed. 2007) (W.D. Mich. 1982) (allowing audio
recordings to be evidence of an intended therapeutic use, though not considering First
Amendment possibilities).
'9 See Alliance for Natural Health v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 60-61, (D.D.C. 2010);
United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 938-39 (7th Cir. 2008); Wallach v. Crawford, No. 04-
CV-216, 2005 WL 6054963, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2005); Whitaker v. Thompson, 239 F.
Supp. 2d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2003); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367-68
(2002); Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Nutritional Health Alliance v.
Shalala, 953 F. Supp. 526, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Nat'l Council for Improved Health v. Shalala,
893 F. Supp. 1512, 1517 (D. Utah 1995); United States v. Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 638 F. Supp.
556, 562 (W.D.N.Y. 1986).
'0 Alliance for Natural Health v. Sebelius; Whitaker v. Thompson; Pearson v. Shalala;
Nutritional Health Alliance v. Shalala; Nat'l Council for Improved Health v. Shalala.
61 See Caputo, 517 F.3d at 937 (promotion for AbTox medical device); United States v.
Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389, 395-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (pharmaceutical sales
representative marketing activities); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366
(2002) ("The parties agree that the advertising and soliciting prohibited by the FDAMA
constitute commercial speech.").
62 See Stern, supra note 19, at 94-100 (noting "the prevalence of easy calls" and arguing
that "[t]he great majority of the Court's decisions have involved communication that qualifies
as commercial speech by virtually any definition.").
63 Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed.
Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997); Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct.
8, 1996).
"
4 Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 62 (D.D.C. 1998).
65 Id. at 64.
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Only in the Lanham Act cases did courts find speech by FDA-regulated
firms to be noncommercial. First, in Beharry v. Bedessee Imports, the court
held not only that an article published in a local newspaper describing FDA
enforcement against a food company was noncommercial speech, but also that
a competitor was engaged in noncommercial speech when it emailed copies of
the article to potential customers with an offer to discuss it.66 The first holding
is relatively uncontroversial-newspaper articles are generally
noncommercial. Even so, the court noted that "[e]ven if the defendants paid
to run the piece with a motivation toward indirectly influencing customers to
buy their goods, such a motivation does not transform the piece into
commercial speech."6 7 However, the court also held that emails attaching the
article were not commercial speech because reproducing the article with an
offer to discuss it "is not a commercial proposition or an advertisement.""
This latter holding seems quite dubious, and would be truly exceptional in
cases challenging FDA restrictions on speech.
In the other Lanham Act case, Bracco Diagnostics v. Amersham Health,
the court found that an article in the New England Journal of Medicine was
noncommercial because "it is a protected form of speech distributed by an
impartial educational journal in the field of medicine" and it "did not advocate
that the reader purchase a particular product over another."69 However,
contrary to the court's position in Beharry v. Bedessee Imports, the court held
that "the secondary dissemination of the article . . . does constitute actionable
commercial speech."7 ' The court recognized that the medical device industry
uses scientific studies "as an especially important and prevalent marketing
tool."7 ' As in 17LF v. Friedman, the court emphasized that because of the
company's financial motivations and resources, it was much more likely for
positive studies about a product to reach customers than negative ones. 72
Thus, the Bracco holding seems more consonant with prevailing wisdom
than the Beharry case-journal articles themselves are protected forms of
speech that deserve heightened scrutiny, while secondary dissemination of
these articles by companies with clear commercial interests do not. Thus,
Beharry represents the only opinion in which speech by an FDA-regulated
company-as opposed to speech by a third party-received heightened
protection.
Moreover, the Lanham Act cases are useful only to the extent they can
help predict what would happen in FDA cases. Misrepresentation and false
advertising claims under the Lanham Act require that the speech occur in
commercial advertising or promotion,"7 which narrows the universe of speech
that might be commercial in other settings. For example, in Bracco
Diagnostics, the court cited traditional commercial speech cases, but also




69 Bracco Diagnostics v. Amersham Health, 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 457 (D.N.J. 2009).
70 Id. at 458.
7'Id. (quoting Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 63).
72 Id. at 458-59.
7 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
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cited Lanham Act cases that seem to construe commercial speech more
narrowly as advertising or promotion.74
My review thus confirms that courts have yet to encounter an FDA-
related case in which the speech was noncommercial. Nonetheless, this
finding does not mean that FDA-regulated firms are categorically incapable of
speaking noncommercially.
V. INDICIA OF NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH?
The Supreme Court has identified three factors for determining whether
speech is commercial or not, always careful to note that no one factor alone is
dispositive. 7s The prevailing test from Bolger asks whether the speech is an
advertisement, whether it refers to a specific product, and whether the
speaker has an economic motive.76 Bolger thus considers the form, content,
and motivation for the speech.
But doctrinally, with all the possible permutations speech can take, I
contend that an even more disaggregated approach would be useful.77
Arguably, the first two factors in Bolger-whether the speech is an
advertisement, and whether it refers to a particular product-both point to
the final factor asking whether the speaker is economically motivated. If this
is true, we should consider all the indicia of commercial intent by ascertaining
the Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How of the speech at issue:78
A. Who is speaking? Is it a commercial entity or not?
B. What does the speech discuss? What is the content? Does it refer to
a specific product? Does it propose a commercial transaction?
C. When is the speech communicated? Is the timing relevant?
D. Where is the speech directed? Who is the intended audience? Does
the speech concern the economic interests of the audience?
E. Why is the speaker speaking? Is the speaker economically
motivated?
F. And how is the speech being communicated? Is it an advertisement
or a noncommercial format?
These questions further corrugate the three-part Bolger test, but together,
they can more clearly identify the discrete "indicia of commercial speech"79
7 4Bracco, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 455-56.
7 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
76 Id.
n Indeed, others have made this argument. See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, A Callfor a Value-
Based Test of Commercial Speech, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 649, 706 (1985). Note also that Bill Vodra
identifies six factors that FDA generally uses to distinguish promotional activities that it will
regulate from educational activities that it will not: (i) the speech's content; (ii) its context;
(iii) its audience; (iv) the medium used to communicate it; (v) the purported rationale for it;
and (vi) the real rationale for it. Vodra, supra note 8, at 592. He notes that the distinction
between promotional and educational activities "is similar to, but not the same as, the
Supreme Court's division between commercial and noncommercial speech." Id. at 591.
7 The modern enunciation of what has become "the Five Ws (and one H)" is most often
attributed to Rudyard Kipling, "The Elephant's Child," in JUST So STORIES 63 (Doubleday
Page & Co., 1912). Again, Bill Vodra suggested that FDA uses similar but not identical criteria
for distinguishing promotional from educational activities. Vodra, supra note 8, at 592-96.
79 Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka, Inconsistent Government Policies: Why FDA Off-
Label Regulation Cannot Survive First Amendment Review under Greater New Orleans, 62
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 12 (2007).
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that distinguish it from noncommercial speech in the novel and difficult cases
presented by FDA-regulated firms.
A. WHO?
Although the Supreme Court has refused to categorize all speech by
commercial entities as necessarily commercial, who is speaking may have the
greatest predictive power in anticipating how courts will categorize speech.
Indeed, the purpose of this Article is to explore whether speech by FDA-
regulated firms can ever be noncommercial. The short answer of course is yes.
But what would it take?
In non-FDA contexts, the Supreme Court has held that speech by
commercial entities can qualify as fully protected noncommercial speech. In
Consolidated Edison Co. ofNew York v. Public Service Commission, the Court
found that when a power company inserted a pamphlet in its monthly bill
advocating nuclear power, it was engaged in fully protected political speech.o
The restriction originated with the Public Service Commission, which tried to
prohibit Con Ed from including with future bills any materials advocating the
company's "opinions or viewpoints on controversial issues of public policy.""'
The Court struck this prohibition down, holding that companies "enjoy the
full panoply of First Amendment protections for their direct comments on
"182public issues.
In the companion case, Central Hudson, the Court refused to apply
heightened protection to a utility company's advertisements for energy
efficient devices, even though the advertisements invoked public concerns
about resource conservation." The Court drew the line between directly
commenting on public issues (Consolidated Edison) and drawing connections
between products and public issues in advertisements (Central Hudson),
which almost any advertiser with a brain can do.
Earlier, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court struck
down a state statute that prohibited banks and other corporate forms from
spending money to influence votes "on any question submitted to the voters,
other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of
the corporation."" The bank tried campaigning against an amendment to the
state constitution that would have authorized a graduated income tax."
Despite the bank's obvious financial interest, the Court held that the value of
speech about government affairs does "not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual."" The Court
said that speech should be classified "by its content rather than its origin."'I
Revisiting the twenty-four cases surveyed above, the vast majority involve
speech by or on behalf of drug, device, or dietary supplement manufacturers.
80 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
81 Id. at 533.
8 Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.3 (referring to the
companion holding in Consolidated Edison).
83 Id. at 557 (1980).
84 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768 (1978).
85 Id. at 769.
88 Id. at 777.
87 Stern, supra note 19, at 93.
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In the Lanham Act cases that found the speech to be noncommercial, both
involved speech by a third party in journals or newspapers, and only the
outlier opinion in Beharry applied heightened scrutiny to the secondary
dissemination of the article." But other than the blip in Beharry, none of the
FDA-related cases found the speech to be noncommercial, even if made by
physicians.89 Physicians speaking as independent medical or scientific experts
with no financial interest in the product presumably would receive heightened
First Amendment protection; physicians speaking on behalf of drug
companies presumably would not, absent unique circumstances. Ralph Hall
and Elizabeth Sobotka offer a dramatized scenario:
Two people give an identical speech to an identical audience
using the identical publicly available scientific information. In
doing so, one person is guilty of a felony violation of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA); the other is hailed as a scientific
leader.9o
Who is speaking can thus convert pure speech into commercial if a
company appropriates it. Again, the court in W'LF v. Friedman explained that
journal reprints, reference texts, and CME seminars are not "typical"
commercial speech because manufacturers are communicating the speech of
scientists, physicians, and academics not employed by the company. 91 But the
court found the speech to be commercial, placing considerable weight on the
fact that "this information is in fact supplied by the manufacturer."2
My intuition is that federal courts will not find speech by FDA-regulated
firms to be noncommercial unless all the other criteria neatly align. Some
think this is entirely appropriate. And some would even argue that all speech
by corporations should be commercial, regardless of the content or
circumstances. 93 Though the Supreme Court recently warned against
" Edward B. Beharry & Co. v. Bedessee Imps. Inc., No. 09-CV-0077, 2010 WL 1223590,
at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2010); Bracco Diagnostics v. Amersham Health, 627 F. Supp. 2d 384,
456-58 (D.N.J. 2009).
89 United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164, 2009 WL 1578712, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 4,
2009) (noting that "[t]he mere fact that Harkonen is an M.D." did not render the speech
noncommercial); Whitaker v. Thompson, 239 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2003) (spending
little time considering whether speech is commercial or not even though plaintiffs included a
physician); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1014, 1997 WL 186325
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) (seminar presentations by physicians speaking on behalf of medical
device manufacturers). In United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395-96 (E.D.N.Y.
2008), a pharmaceutical sales representative adopted First Amendment defenses by a
physician defendant, Dr. Gleason. Although Caronia did not argue that his speech was
noncommercial, the court noted that Dr. Gleason had made such an argument before pleading
guilty to misbranding under the FDCA. Id. at 390, 395-96.
90 Hall & Sobotka, supra note 79.
91Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 62 (D.D.C. 1998).
2 Id. at 65.
9' Richard M. Alderman, Commercial Entities'Noncommercial Speech: A Contradiction in
Terms, 1982 UTAH L. REv. 731, 744 (1982); see also Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can
Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-Commercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 393-96
(2006) (arguing that because corporations have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to pursue
corporate profits, "all legitimate corporate expenditures . . . must be commercial in a sense,
including expenditures to publish speech").
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regulations that render speech to be legal or illegal based on who is
speaking,94 FDA's regulatory scheme requires precisely this.
B. WHAT?
What does the speech discuss? What is its content? The first two factors
in Bolger-asking whether the speech is an advertisement, and whether it
refers to a particular product 95-require courts to scrutinize the content of the
speech.
The second factor, asking whether the speech refers to a specific product,
is relatively straightforward, with one complication in FDA contexts. Firms
might try to evade FDA's jurisdiction over "labels" and "labeling" by referring
to products not by name, but by mentioning a class of products that includes
their own, or by discussing the product's uses or the diseases or conditions
that it treats, or by using any number of proxies without naming the product
itself. Theoretically, a company might seek heightened protection for speech
discussing a medical condition without explicitly mentioning the product that
treats it. Nevertheless, FDA is usually able to read between the lines, and the
Supreme Court has affirmed FDA's broad jurisdiction over "labeling" to
include any materials that "accompany," or "supplement or explain" a
product. 96
But the theoretical limitation remains. The court in WLF v. Friedman
noted that industry-sponsored CME might qualify as noncommercial speech if
manufacturers supported "CME regardless of whether their products would
ultimately be addressed."7 Indeed, this would seem to satisfy FDA's
longstanding recommendation that firms that sponsor "educational" seminars
or symposia "have little or no influence" over the venue, speaker, topics, or
written materials associated with such events.9 '
Typically, the more difficult consideration is whether the speech is an
advertisement under the first criterion in Bolger. The decisions that I surveyed
above interpreted this factor liberally. In United States v. Caronia, the court
applied a functional definition of "advertisement" to find that various
promotional activities by a pharmaceutical sales representative were
commercial speech. 99 And in WLF v. Friedman, the court found that hosting
CME seminars and distributing reprints of scientific and medical articles were
"advertisements" because they "emphasize a desirable quality" about the
product "in hopes that the physician will prescribe" it.oo Courts recognize that
" See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 191 (1999). For an
argument that FDA's restrictions on off-label promotion violate Greater New Orleans, see Hall
& Sobotka, supra note 79. Note also that the Court's recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), expressed significant skepticism about "speech restrictions based on the
identity of the speaker," id. at 899, although the restrictions here were clearly focused on
political, noncommercial speech. Id. at 886.
9 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983).
9 Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 348-52 (1948); United States v. Urbuteit, 335
U.S. 355, 357 (1948).
9 Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
9' Vodra, supra note 8, at 591 (citing a March 14, 1989 speech by Ken Feather to the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association Marketing Section).
9 United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389, 395-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
100 Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
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"advertisement" should be construed broadly, particularly for FDA-regulated
firms.
Of course, the content of speech can include both commercial and
noncommercial elements-so-called "hybrid" speech. In non-FDA cases, the
Court has severed commercial from noncommercial elements,10' suggesting
that "severable noncommercial elements of the mixed speech at issue would
be fully protected if removed from the setting of commercial solicitation."10 2
Accordingly, political pamphlets included with utility bills can qualify as
noncommercial speech, even if the bill itself is plainly commercial.x'o
The trick of course is determining whether the elements of speech are
indeed severable. The Court will ask "whether the content of a communication
contains an essential, inextricable dimension of fully protected expression. "104
If the noncommercial elements are essential to the communication, 0 ' the
non-severable commercial elements will also receive heightened protection.
In the FDA cases I surveyed, courts have not been very charitable on this
point. For example, in IMS Health v. Sorrell, the court found that prescribing
data "combines commercial and noncommercial elements" because "[i]t is
factual information with a degree of redeeming social importance" that could
be used to improve public health, for example, by contributing to health
research, educational communications, or safety notices."0 6 In IMS Health v.
Ayotte, the First Circuit said that even if gathering and disseminating
prescriber data for marketing purposes was speech rather than conduct, it "is
of scant societal value."0 7 Yet, courts in FDA-related cases have not been
confronted with fact patterns similar to those in Consolidated Edison or
Bellotti. Thus, for example, FDA-regulated firms might be able to directly
comment on public policy issues in pamphlets distributed with physician
labeling, although none have found it worthwhile to do so.
Another complication in using the content of speech to categorize it arises
when the speech is scientific. Some of the most difficult cases concern
companies' scientific claims about the health and safety of their products.'
Courts have been careful to note that scientific articles and publications are "a
protected form of speech," warning that it would be "inappropriate to inquire
into the validity of scientific theories which are not commercial speech and
promulgated in scientific journals."' Yet, courts will look beyond the form of
the speech by asking, for example, whether a company sponsored the
underlying research or paid the author to write the article, and whether the
'o' Stern, supra note 19, at 89-92.
102 Id. at 121.
10 First Natl Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775-86 (1978); see Consol. Edison
Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537-41 (1980).
'0 Stern, supra note 19, at 89 (citing Riley v. Natl Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487
U.S. 781, 786 (1988)).
1'0 Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (analyzing a
university rule that prohibited commercial entities from operating on campus).
1'0 IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 447 (D. Vt. 2009).
107 IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008).
10 Stern, supra note 19, at 127.
109 Bracco Diagnostics v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 457-58 (D.N.J.
2009) See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D.C. Cir.
1991) ("It is equally settled . . . that the First Amendment protects scientific expression and
debate just as it protects political and artistic expression.").
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article itself recommended that readers buy one product over another.no'
There is a good argument that drug companies that hire "ghostwriters" to
publish positive scientific articles about their products are engaged in
commercial speech."' Thus, even in ostensibly difficult cases, courts'
categorization of the speech as commercial is easily defensible.112
Judicial skepticism here might stem from courts' recognition that
scientific and medical publications are "an especially important and prevalent
marketing tool" for FDA-regulated industries." Indeed, some courts find that
manufacturer dissemination of scientific literature is commercial speech
without much analysis.' Courts also recognize that a company's resources
and motivations make it much more likely for positive studies about products
to reach prescribers than negative ones,"' removing some of the
noncommercial gloss from these publications.
Thus, although mixed scientific speech would seem to complicate the
content analysis in FDA cases, few courts have struggled to categorize speech
by FDA-regulated firms as commercial."'
C. WHEN?
Courts and scholars have not paid much attention to when speech is
communicated, and how such timing might distinguish commercial from
noncommercial speech. Nevertheless, the timing of speech might reveal its
motivations. For example, when considering whether a press release by
DuPont Merck that questioned the safety of a new generic competitor was
commercial, the court noted that DuPont had timed the press release to
coincide with the generic drug's release.' Conversely, if a company makes
public statements in a debate about the safety of a product that it has recalled
or otherwise no longer markets, this could suggest noncommercial motives."s
no 627 F. Supp. 2d at 457-58.
.." See, e.g., Duff Wilson, Drug Maker Hired Writing Company for Doctor's Book,
Documents Say, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 29, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/business/30drug.html.
12 See, e.g., Natl Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977)
(upholding FTC order that prohibited trade association from running false ads arguing that
"there is no scientific evidence that eating eggs increases the risk of... heart [and circulatory]
disease . . ."); In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 F.T.C. 539 (1988) (FTC decision that
advertisement titled "Of Cigarettes and Science" qualified as commercial speech under Bolger
criteria).
11 Bracco Diagnostics, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 458; Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 51, 63 (D.D.C. 1998).
1 Wallach v. Crawford, No. 04-CV-216, 2005 WL 6054963 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2005)
(involving dietary supplement manufacturers distributing portions of a chapter in the
Physician's Desk Reference discussing the therapeutic uses and health effects of magnesium).
1" See Bracco Diagnostics, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 458-59; Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13
F. Supp. 2d at 65; Margaret A. Hamburg, Innovation, Regulation, and the FDA, 363 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2228, 2231 (2010) (discussing studies showing that larger percentages of
positive trials are published than negative ones).
16 Moreover, FDA tends to look at the content of speech only after using other criteria to
determine if it is promotional or educational. Vodra, supra note 8, at 593.
117 In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 98-1232-SLR, 1998 U.S. Dist. WL
883469, at *13-14 (D. Del. Dec. 7, 1998).
us Of course, companies that recall products often do so temporarily and hope to sell
them again, in which case the company would have clear commercial motives to defend its
product. Pfizer, for example, vigorously defended Vioxx after it was pulled from the market.
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D. WHERE?
Where is the speech directed? Is it to potential customers or prescribers?
To patients? Investors? The scientific community? Policymakers? The
Supreme Court's early jurisprudence identified commercial speech as that
relating to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.119 In the
Nike case, the California Supreme Court noted that the audience targeted by
Nike-college administrators and the general public-"is likely to be actual or
potential buyers or customers of the speaker's goods or services, or persons
acting for actual or potential buyers or customers."1 Nike thus addressed its
arguments to customers and potential customers. Of course, examining the
target audience is not a foolproof analysis for companies like Nike whose
customer base is broad and general, and who might be the intended recipients
of both advertisements and public policy arguments.
Similarly, it is not easy to categorize speech by FDA-regulated firms based
solely on its audience. Ordinarily, scientific speech directed at the scientific or
medical communities might warrant more protection than speech directed at
customers. But again, FDA-regulated firms complicate this analysis because
these audiences overlap-physicians and other prescribers that properly
belong to the medical and scientific community are also potential customers.
In fact, courts considering First Amendment defenses to FDA actions have
noted that pharmaceutical marketing and promotion is unique in this
regard.121
Nevertheless, FDA policies recognize the importance of the target
audience. The prohibition against promoting products for off-label uses carves
out exceptions for companies wishing to discuss off-label uses with investors,
researchers, and research subjects. 12 2 But even these exceptions cause
problems for the FDA, which recognizes that physicians and potential
prescribers might also be investors and researchers.123 Thus, although the
target audience might be a relevant factor in delineating commercial from
noncommercial speech, it can provide conflicting evidence as to the speaker's
motives.
Further complicating the analysis is the reality that companies may target
primary and secondary audiences. For example, in 1987 FDA objected to
Sandoz publishing a full-page "notice" in the New York Times and Washington
Post stating that one of its products did not cause a particular side effect. 124
Though the notice was addressed to physicians, the FDA took the position
that Sandoz was trying to promote the product because it could have used
more targeted ways to communicate that message to physicians. 2 ' Likewise,
in the mid-1980s the saga of ICN Pharmaceuticals was notable in part
because ICN sent video news segments to shareholders and television stations
"1 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
120 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256 (Cal. 2002).
"' Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
112 Hall & Sobotka, supra note 79, at 9. For example, companies can violate their
obligations under federal securities law if they fail to disclose material information about
products. See, e.g., SEC v. Biopure Corp., Civil No. 05-11853 WGY (Sept. 14, 2005).
123 Vodra, supra note 8, at 592-96; Hall & Sobotka, supra note 79, at 9.
124 Vodra, supra note 8, at 594.
125Id.
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discussing research supporting new uses for one of its products.'26 Again, the
FDA found that ICN was trying to promote the product because
communicating to investors did not require national media.12 7
In both cases, the company tried to camouflage its intent to promote to a
secondary audience by ostensibly targeting a more innocent primary audience
first. Consequently, courts should read between the lines as the FDA has
learned to do.
E. WHY?
Why is the speaker speaking? The speaker's motives are perhaps the most
important factor in determining whether the speech is commercial or not. The
Supreme Court's early jurisprudence relied heavily on economic motives to
identify commercial speech. In Central Hudson, the Court said that speech is
commercial if it "related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience."'28 In Bolger, the test evolved to include three factors, the third
being whether the speech is economically motivated. 2 9 Again, it is arguable
that the first two factors-whether the speech is an advertisement, and
whether it discusses a particular product-also try to illuminate why the
speaker is speaking.
Yet, as early as Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court recognized that
economic motives do not automatically disqualify speech from heightened
protection.' In Bolger, the Court reiterated that an economic motive, without
more, does not render the speech commercial."' For the tougher cases,
Central Hudson delineated between "direct comments on public issues" that
deserve heightened protection and public policy arguments "made only in the
context of commercial transactions."'3 2 Thus, although the Court clearly
considers commercial intent, it is careful not to over-rely on it.
The Court's hesitation may stem from the problem of ascertaining
commercial intent, and the reality that even noncommercial speech may be
economically motivated. Justice Stevens observed that "even Shakespeare may
have been motivated by the prospect of pecuniary reward.""' Indeed, the
Court has found speech by commercial entities to be noncommercial in cases
in which the entity had a clear financial interest in speaking."' Lower courts
have also shown a willingness to painstakingly review the content of speech to
determine whether it proposes a commercial transaction or otherwise tries to
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
129 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 60, 65-68 (1983) (stating that the fact
that pamphlets are advertisements, refer to a specific product, and are economically motivated
provides "strong support" that the pamphlets are "properly characterized as commercial
speech").
120 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
1"I Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66.
132 447 U.S. at 563 & n.5.
133 Id. at 580 (Stevens, J., concurring).
134 See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
(energy utility company advocating for nuclear power); Fist Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978) (bank objecting to proposed amendment to state constitution authorizing
personal income tax).
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induce sales.' Thus, the Court has always been careful to avoid resting the
distinction on commercial intent,' which it considers almost "forbidden
territory."13 7 Nevertheless, most of the factors that courts consider essentially
point towards the overarching question of why the speaker is speaking.
It is worth noting that in recent years, litigants and government
investigators have uncovered internal documents that reveal motivations far
different than those cited by drug and device companies.1' In the past decade,
aggressive enforcement of federal fraud and abuse laws has pulled the curtain
on industry marketing and promotional practices, revealing creative,
sophisticated, and far-reaching efforts to generate sales. These nontraditional
methods often obscure commercial intent with ostensibly educational or
scientific speech.
Mixed or "hybrid" speech complicates the analysis, as noted above, but the
Court has held that mixed motives do not, in and of themselves, render
otherwise commercial speech noncommercial. 13 9 For example, "advertising
which links a product to a current public debate is not thereby entitled" to
heightened protection.140 The query is "whether the content of a
communication contains an essential, inextricable dimension of fully
protected expression."' 1 The speech in Nike v. Kasky was a unique mix of
commercial and noncommercial. Breyer's dissent argued that Nike's speech
deserved heightened protection in part because Nike's contribution to the
debate over its foreign labor practices was central rather than peripheral.'42
Other courts have rejected the argument by companies that commercial
aspects of speech are "inextricably intertwined" with noncommercial ones, or
that it is impossible to "delink" the products from public debates about
them.'" Courts may ask whether the company is responsible for linking the
commercial and noncommercial aspects. It is one thing for noncommercial
speech to be "inextricably intertwined" with commercial speech, such that the
noncommercial elements are essential to the communication," it is quite
another when a company "voluntarily intertwines" the speech."' In the
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, the court found that DuPont Merck's
135 See, e.g., Slane v. Emoto, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1080-83 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (reviewing a
naturopath's books discussing the therapeutic effects of water and various devices, finding that
it was noncommercial speech because "[n]o statement in any of the books proposes a
commercial transaction with respect to any [product]").
1"' Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761-65
(1976).
127 Kozinski & Banner, supra note 9, at 640.
13s Indeed, Vodra noted in 1989 that the purported rationale for drug industry speech
often varied from its "true intent." Vodra, supra note 8, at 595.
139 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983).
140 Id. at 68 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 563, n.5 (1980)).
141 Stern, supra note 19, at 89 (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487
U.S. 781, 796 (1988)).
142 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 677-78 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring).
1 Commonwealth Brands v. United States, No. 1:09-CV-117M, 2009 WL 3754273, at *6
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2009).
1 Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (analyzing a
university rule that prohibited commercial entities from operating on campus).
145 In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 98-1232-SLR, 1998 WL 883469, at
*15 (D. Del. Dec. 7, 1998).
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speech was commercial notwithstanding its noncommercial elements that
discussed drug safety in scientific and medical terms.14 ' DuPont Merck's
statements "were not confined solely to defendant's efforts to influence public
policy on generic substitution of warfarin sodium drugs.""14
And although CME seminars include scientific and medical discussions
that could easily qualify as noncommercial speech in a vacuum, courts have
found that these seminars increase sales and are clearly economically
motivated."' Thus, companies cannot insulate promotional efforts by
inserting noncommercial speech. In fact, when the Court first confronted
commercial speech back in 1942, it declined to protect an advertisement that
had been amended to include political statements for the purpose of
insulating it from regulation.'49
What if the speaker's motives are mixed but skew much more heavily
towards the noncommercial? The Court has held that companies deserve full
First Amendment protection for noncommercial speech that directly
addresses issues of public concern, even if the speaker has an obvious financial
interest.so Thus, for example, it might be difficult for state or federal law to
prohibit drug manufacturers from funding CME at all if the company has no
influence over the speaker, the subject, or the content of the seminar, and
does not engage in any marketing or advertising in connection with it.'5 1
Likewise, a noncommercial standard might apply to speeches by medical or
scientific personnel from drug companies, speaking at events that were clearly
scientific or educational, for example as being one speaker on a panel of
experts at a university conference.
A key question might be whether the speaker would communicate the
speech if it would have no foreseeable affect, or even a negative effect, on
future sales? For example, what if a drug company sponsored a CME seminar
that focused on negative clinical trial results for its product? What if a
company distributed reprints of a journal article that speaks favorably about a
competitor's product but not its own? In 14LF v. Friedman, the court
explained that manufacturers will only disseminate studies that present their
products in a "favorable light."'52
But companies will often discuss the limitations of their products,
particularly if that limitation is the lack of FDA approval. For example, an
executive for Genentech cautioned in an interview with a physician
publication that even though retinal physicians were using its product Avastin
off-label to treat age-related macular degeneration, "there have been no safety
and toxicity studies conducted on Avastin" for that use.' The executive also
146 Id.
'
47 1d. at *14.
'' Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 64 (1998).
'49 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
1I Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 60, 68 (1983); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980).
15 See, e.g. Wash Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 64 (noting that the speech might be
noncommercial if manufacturers supported "CME regardless of whether their products would
ultimately be addressed").
152 Id. at 65.
153 Genentech: Avastin Not Intended for AMD: Company Cautions on Off-Label Use of
Cancer Drug, RETINAL PHYSICIAN (Jan. 2006),
http://www.retinalphysician.com/article.aspx?article=100181.
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warned that the drug and its manufacturing standards may not be suitable as
an ophthalmic drug.'"' Such statements, standing alone, would probably
qualify as fully protected speech.
Of course, he did not stop there. The Genentech executive also stated in
the same interview that physicians prescribing Avastin for off-label uses "are
doing it with noble intent, which is to help patients who are going blind as we
speak," commending retinal physicians for being "a close-knit, well-informed
group that has excellent communication and is motivated to do the best they
can for their patients."' A skeptical court might construe this as a wink and a
nod-warning that Avastin has not been tested for ophthalmic uses, but
patting prescribers on the back for using it in this way (in a publication
specifically targeted to retinal physicians, no less).
Moreover, even ostensibly negative statements by a company about its
products might be commercially motivated on a deeper level. For example, a
company might warn the public about a product's risks and side effects to
insulate the company from future legal liability."' Even though such a
statement obviously would not propose a commercial transaction, it could
ultimately affect the company's balance sheets.
Thus, why the speaker is speaking may be the most important inquiry in
Bolger-and also the most difficult to prove objectively. The other factors in
Bolger arguably point to this question. I offer additional factors to consider,
but even these also arguably point to the fulcrum question of why the speaker
is speaking. Is it to propose a commercial transaction or otherwise to generate
sales? This so-called "forbidden territory"'17 seems to be the key inquiry.
F. How?
How is the speech communicated? In what form and context? From early
in its commercial speech jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has recognized
that simply because speech is made via an advertisement "clearly does not
compel the conclusion that [it is] commercial speech."' 8 Although the second
factor in Bolger asks whether the speech is an advertisement, this factor alone
is not dispositive.
1 Id.
"1 Id. For a general discussion, see Osborn, supra note 51, at 336-38. Although Osborn
questions whether Genentech "could lawfully communicate directly to physicians any safety
information that related to the off-label use" of Avastin for AMD during this period, this
position is exceedingly cautious and of questionable accuracy. Id. at 338 (emphasis added).
Ralph Hall and Elizabeth Sobotka also take a surprisingly restrictive view of what companies
could lawfully communicate about off-label uses. Hall & Sobotka, supra note 79. Obviously,
there is significant uncertainty over what FDA would and would not permit. But it is highly
unlikely that FDA would, as an enforcement matter, pursue companies for off-label promotion
on the sole basis of communicating scientific studies or sharing concerns about the safety of
off-label uses without also attempting to promote that use. See FDA, Guidance for Industry:
Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or
Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses ofApproved Drugs and Approved
or Cleared Medical Devices (Jan. 2009), http://www.fda.gov/oc/op/goodreprint.html.
1"6 Hall & Sobotka, supra note 79, at 14 (doubting that a court would consider this to be a
sufficient economic motivation).
157 Kozinski & Banner, supra note 9, at 640.
1ss Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 60, 66 (1983) (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964)).
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On the flipside, courts have also been unwilling to categorize speech as
noncommercial just because it is not communicated via traditional
advertisements or promotion.'5 9 For example, the court in Commonwealth
Brands recently rejected an argument that the Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act regulated noncommercial speech because it
restricted materials other than labeling or advertising about certain tobacco
products."'o The court explained that "press releases, booklets, and television
appearances" were not necessarily pure speech if the statute targets "speech by
economically-motivated tobacco-product manufacturers" that direct these
communications to consumers and discuss specific products.' The court also
emphasized that tobacco companies have a history of using "a variety of media
including scientific research papers" to mislead consumers about the health
risks of tobacco products.'6 2 Thus, courts will not hesitate to apply commercial
speech standards if the speech is clearly economically motivated, regardless of
the form it takes or how it is communicated.
As noted above, several courts in FDA-related cases have had no problem
categorizing nontraditional forms of speech as commercial. For example, in
United States v. Harkonen, the court rejected a drug executive's argument
that press releases discussing clinical trial results were pure scientific or even
mixed speech.' 3 The press release in question misrepresented study results for
the drug Actimmune, and was distributed by sales representatives and faxed
to over 2,000 potential prescribers.'" The court applied the criteria in Bolger
and found that: (i) the speech was a press release and not itself a peer-
reviewed publication; (ii) it referred to a specific commercial product; and
(iii) it was "unquestionably disseminated for commercial benefit."'6 5 The court
explained that "[t]he mere fact that Harkonen is an M.D., that the press
release he prepared presented actual data and statistical analyses, and that the
dissemination of the press release may have generated vigorous debate . . . do
not disturb this conclusion."' The court hammered the point home by noting
that the case "would present a thorny issue for the court were it not for the
fact that the allegations . . . do not trench anywhere near the outer bounds of
speech deemed commercial."' 7 The lesson is that manipulating how the
speech is communicated will not mask its content or motivations.
s Note that courts have been careful in FDA contexts not to stretch FDA's jurisdiction to
books and other publications that espouse "ideas, beliefs and mental processes." United States
v. Undetermined Quantities of Article of Device, Med. Devices Rep. (CCH) 15,055 (W.D.
Mich. Nov. 22, 1982) (holding that FDA could use statements in books and other materials as
objective evidence of "intended use," without asserting jurisdiction over those materials
directly).
160 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. No. 1:09-CV-117-M, 2009 WL 3754273, at *6 (W.D. Ky.
Nov. 5, 2009).
16] Id. at *6.
'' Id. (citing United States. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1121 (D.C. Cir.
2009)).
16I United States v. Harkonen, No. C08-00164 MHP, 2009 WL 1578712, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
June 4, 2009).
164 Id. at *1-3.
165 Id. at *6.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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In fact, courts will take a hard look at how the information is packaged,
presented, and distributed-the circumstances surrounding how the speech is
communicated. In Wallach v. Crawford, the court found that a packet of
information distributed by a dietary supplement manufacturer was
commercial even though it included a chapter from the Physician's Desk
Reference, a "peer-reviewed scientific reference text."' The manufacturer sent
the reprint to potential customers along with a cover letter, a list of the
company's products and their prices, and stickers affixed to each page with the
company's name, logo, and phone number.6 9 The packet was clearly intended
to induce sales, and the court spent very little time declaring it commercial.170
Likewise, in the Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, the court found that
press releases, computer software, letters, faxes, slide presentations, and other
forms of speech by DuPont Merck were commercial because each promoted
the company's product in relation to its generic competitor.x
Context matters here. For example, even ostensibly scientific or medical
speech communicated via educational seminars and CME events can be
commercial if the circumstances reveal a promotional intent. 17' For example,
in the Orthopedic Bone Screw Litigation, the court noted that if a seminar is
organized by sales and marketing personnel, if these personnel track
attendees or follow up with sales calls, if they distribute marketing and
promotional materials at booths, and if the physician speakers have a direct
financial stake, then the seminars as a whole would be commercial.' 7a The
Third Circuit concluded that "[i]f true, these allegations would provide strong
support for characterizing the seminars as commercial speech."17 '
This contextual evidence also drives FDA policy. For example, when the
FDA decides whether a seminar is educational (and thus largely exempt from
FDA requirements) or promotional (and not exempt), it considers who is
speaking, whether and how the speaker is compensated, whether there is
interaction with the audience suggesting a scientific exchange, the setting in
which the speech occurs, and what inducements the audience received to
attend. 7' A genuinely educational program will not involve company
representatives presenting branded information, without the chance for
questions and answers, on an "expense-paid cruise to Bermuda," for
example.'7 ' Even if the content itself is scientific-for example, presenting the
results of clinical trials -the context would clearly be commercial.
"' Wallach v. Crawford, No. 04-CV-216, 2005 WL 6054963, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29,
2005).
169 Id. at *1.
170 See id. at *8.
'71 In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 98-1232-SLR, 1998 WL 883469, at
*11-15 (D. Del. Dec. 17, 1998).
172 See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 793 (3d Cir.
1999) (not finding enough evidence at the motion to dismiss stage to determine whether the
speech was commercial or not).
173 Id. at 793; In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 1997 WL 186325, at *13.
174 In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d at 793. The court, however,
went on to note that this was a factual dispute that the court was not prepared to resolve at the
motion to dismiss stage. Id. at 794.
171 Vodra, supra note 8, at 593-94.
176 Id. at 593.
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Even speech that is inherently scientific-such as health claims about
dietary supplements-is routinely treated by courts as commercial if it
appears on the label or in the labeling of FDA-regulated products. For
example, the claims that antioxidants reduce the risk of certain cancers or that
omega-3 fatty acids may reduce the risk of coronary heart disease are, on their
face, scientific. But courts recognize that marketers add these claims
"presumably hoping to bolster sales by increasing the allure of their
supplements' labels . .. ..""' Thus, courts will look beyond the form and even
the content of speech to consider the speaker's motivations.
Moreover, although courts are reluctant to find articles published in peer-
reviewed scientific and medical journals to be commercial speech, they will
not hesitate to hold that their secondary dissemination by companies is.17 The
original publication and its redistribution are two separate forms of speech.
Moreover, FDA itself considers whether the journal is a bona fide medical
journal. The agency has long been skeptical of medical journals published and
funded by drug companies. 79 As Bill Vodra notes, the FDA has repeatedly
criticized "start-up publications entitled, optimistically, Volume 1, Number 1,"
that are not followed by "Volume 1, Number 2," or that are funded entirely by
one company and feature one of its products.'s Again, the context can be
revealing.
Finally, rarely is speech by an FDA-regulated firm a singular event.
Companies often speak as part of a larger effort to promote or brand a
product. Firms frequently reinforce core advertising and promotion with
peripheral speech that is more difficult to categorize as commercial at first
glance.' Perhaps for this reason the FDA is particularly wary of preapproval
promotion, aware that first impressions are lasting ones, and is sensitive to
the fact that later corrections or qualifications are often lost on the
audience.18 2
Thus, although not dispositive, how the speech is communicated remains
important.'
17 Pearson, 164 F.3d at 651.
178 To wit, in Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., a Lanham Act case, the
court held that an article published in the New England Journal of Medicine about x-ray
contrast media was noncommercial in part because "it is a protected form of speech." 627 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 457 (D.N.J. 2009). But the court held that "secondary dissemination of the
article" is commercial speech, noting that the industry uses scientific studies and articles "as
an especially important and prevalent marketing tool." Id. at 458 (quoting Wash. Legal Found.
v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63 (D.D.C. 1998)).
17 Vodra, supra note 8, at 594.
180 Id.
18' I owe the above observations in this paragraph to discussions with Bill Vodra.
Telephone Interview with Bill Vodra, Senior Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP (Jan. 3, 2011).
182 Vodra, supra note 8, at 588.
For example, in Nike v. Kasky, Nike had sent letters to university presidents and
athletic directors, published press releases, and published arguments about its overseas labor
practices in other non-advertising forms. The outcome might have been different if Nike
personnel had made statements at debates on college campuses, via television or in news
interviews. Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 49, at 1148 (discussing Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S.
654 (2003)).
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G. GOVERNMENT MOTIVATIONS?
A notable observation from reviewing the FDA-related cases is that courts
sometimes examine the scope and purposes of the law being challenged to
determine whether the speech it regulates is commercial or not. This
approach conflates the first-order question of whether the speech is
commercial (Bolger) with the second-order question of whether the restriction
violates free speech rights (Central Hudson).
For example, in Commonwealth Brands, tobacco companies challenged
the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which for the
first time authorized the FDA to regulate tobacco products.' 4 The Act heavily
restricts the claims that companies can make about "modified risk" products
that purport to reduce the risks or harms from tobacco-related illnesses.' The
Act targets not only claims made in the labeling or advertising for modified
risk products, but also "any action directed to consumers through the media
or otherwise.""s'
This latter provision, tobacco companies argued, covers pure,
noncommercial speech because it would apply to materials like "press
releases, booklets, and television appearances," among other items."' The
court disagreed that the form alone could render this speech noncommercial,
in part by reasoning that the statute targets speech by "economically-
motivated" tobacco companies, and that the speech is aimed at consumers and
discusses a particular product.'"' But this is circular reasoning: because the
statute targets commercial speech, the speech it regulates must be
commercial.
Similar reasoning was employed by two courts considering First
Amendment challenges to state prescription confidentiality laws that limit the
use and dissemination of prescriber data captured by data mining companies.
In IMS Health v. Ayotte, the court held that gathering and disseminating
prescriber data was conduct rather than speech, but that even if it was speech,
it would be commercial.'89 Although the First Circuit did not spend much time
on the commercial speech question, it treated the speech as commercial
because the law targets only commercial uses of prescribing data.1o Likewise,
in IMS Health v. Sorrell, the district court noted that while prescribing data
"combines commercial and noncommercial elements," the Vermont law
targets only its commercial uses in marketing and "does not regulate use of
the data for non-commercial purposes such as health care research,
educational communications, or safety notices." 9' Thus, according to both
courts, the use and dissemination of prescriber data is commercial speech (if
anything) because the law targets only commercial uses.
184 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, 21 U.S.C. § 387a.
'" See 21 U.S.C. § 387k(b).
186 21 U.S.C. § 387k(b)(2)(A)(iii); Commonwealth Brands v. United States, No. 1:09-CV-
117M, 2009 WL 3754273, at *1-2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2009).
187 Id. at *6.
188 Id.
189 550 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008).
190 Id. at 54-55.
'' 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 447 (D. Vt. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).
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These opinions focus on the law itself to determine whether the speech it
regulates is commercial or not,192 conflating the Bolger and Central Hudson
queries. This suggests that, given the history of litigation, courts may try to
avoid invalidating on First Amendment grounds laws that target the drug and
device industries. Again, the FDA's regulatory scheme depends on the use of
words,'93 and courts might use this interpretive mechanism to avoid
invalidating the agency's entire regulatory scheme on constitutional grounds.
On the other hand, if a law expressly limits itself to regulating commercial
speech-or commercial uses of speech-then the law's purpose and scope
might be relevant to both the Bolger and Central Hudson queries.
H. MAKING SENSE OF THESE FACTORS
This Article takes a reductionist approach, isolating the factors courts use
to distinguish commercial from noncommercial speech. I examine the WIho,
What, When, Where, Why, and How of the speech at issue, both in notable
Supreme Court opinions and in twenty-four cases in which FDA-regulated
firms claimed First Amendment protection. Reaggregating these factors yields
a few noteworthy observations.
First, most of these factors essentially try to reveal why the speaker is
speaking-whether the speech is commercially motivated. For example, "Who
is speaking?" asks whether the speaker is a commercial entity. "What does the
speech discuss?" asks whether the speech proposes a commercial transaction,
and whether it refers to a particular product, per Bolger. "When is the speech
communicated?" asks whether the timing reveals any commercial intent.
"Where is the speech directed?" tries to ascertain if the intended audience
includes potential customers. "How is the speech communicated?" asks
whether it is an advertisement, per Bolger. The factors thus boil down to why
the speaker is speaking, suggesting that, contrary to the Court's own
proclamations,'" commercial intent is paramount rather than "forbidden
territory."' 5
The second notable observation is that the most frequently used proxy for
determining whether speech is commercially motivated is the speaker's
identity. Who is speaking thus holds significant predictive power in
distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech. Except for two
Lanham Act cases of questionable relevance, every case involving an FDA-
regulated firm found the speech to be commercial. In the next section, I
explore how the right mix of factors might lead a court to find speech by an
FDA-regulated firm to be noncommercial. But again, courts have yet to
encounter such a mix.
192 There are hints of this approach in at least one Lanham Act case, In re Warfarin
Sodium Antitrust Litigation. There, the court held that speech by DuPont Merck arguing that
its product Coumadin presented fewer safety risks than the new generic version was
commercial, in part by focusing on the nature of the legal violation alleged-product
disparagement. No. MDL 98-1232-SLR, 1998 WL 883469, at *13-14 (D. Del. Dec. 17, 1998).
193 See Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, supra note 2, 67 Fed. Reg. at
34,943.
" Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-65
(1976).
'9' Kozinski & Banner, supra note 9, at 640.
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The third notable observation is that FDA-regulated firms are not
internally monolithic, which can make it difficult to neatly characterize the
company's motivations as commercial or not. For example, pharmaceutical
firms tend to be large, complex organizations, and their scientific and medical
personnel may not possess identical interests or motivations as sales and
marketing personnel. Moreover, some speakers blur the line between
commercial and noncommercial-in some companies, "medical liaisons" may
be glorified sales representatives, but in others, they have little to no pressure
to generate sales. External physicians and "thought lcaders" paid to speak on
behalf of companies can also blur the line for purposes of categorizing speech.
Therefore, it may be crude to categorize the speech according to the
organization's interests rather than the individual speaker's.
Fourth, if all these things are true, then perhaps reductionism is the
wrong approach, like trying to understand a pointillist painting by staring
closely at the individual dots. Greater detail does not always produce greater
clarity. 9' If all the factors point towards a single factor-the speaker's
motivations-then why bother reducing the speech into separate components?
The value, I think, in taking a reductionist approach is to more accurately
isolate and evaluate the relevant factors in the difficult cases. Categorizing the
speech in such cases requires courts to consider the totality of the
circumstances-which itself requires courts to identify who is speaking, about
what, when, where, why, and how. These queries systematically reveal the
indicia of commercial speech.
VI. DISTINCTION-BLURRING SPEECH BY FDA-REGULATED FIRMS
When should speech by an FDA-regulated firm qualify as
noncommercial? As I emphasize above, who is speaking is a powerful
predictor of whether the speech is commercial, and courts almost uniformly
categorize speech by FDA-regulated firms this way.
Nevertheless, there are scenarios in which speech by an FDA-regulated
firm should qualify for heightened protection. The most obvious would
involve a firm directly commenting on an issue of public concern within the
parameters of Bellotti or Consolidated Edison.197 For instance, a drug
manufacturer might include with its prescribing information or package
insert a separate pamphlet opposing cuts to Medicare reimbursement. Or a
tobacco company might take out a page-long ad in the New York Times
objecting to a proposed FDA regulation."* Perhaps an even clearer example
would be submitting public comments during notice-and-comment
rulemaking by the FDA.
But would anything less explicit qualify? Press releases offer an
interesting vehicle for exploring the parameters of commercial speech. Since
196 Stern, supra note 19, at 145.
197 First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
19s For example, the Mobil Corporation has long paid for ads in the New York Times and
other papers advocating certain public policy positions. See, e.g., Mobil Corp., Climate Change:
A Degree of Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1997, at A31; Mobil Corp. It's Time to Pass the
Trade Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1988, at A23. For a discussion of this practice, see Stern,
supra note 19, at 122-23.
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the early 1980s, the FDA has taken the position that press releases
disseminated by or on behalf of a manufacturer that refer to a particular
product qualify under the broad definition of "labeling" in the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.' 99 Based on this reasoning, the Agency has sent
dozens of letters to companies objecting to press materials or the information
they contain.200
But not every press release by an FDA-regulated firm would qualify as
labeling subject to FDA jurisdiction. Likewise, not every press release would
constitute commercial speech, even if it refers to a particular product. For
example, imagine that a pharmaceutical manufacturer issued a press release
defending its clinical research for a controversial cancer drug that it recently
recalled for safety reasons. The press release addresses a public debate over
whether the FDA should have approved the drug in the first place, and
whether the company engaged in misconduct during clinical trials. Suppose
the company has no plans to reintroduce the drug to the market, but wants to
defend its scientific integrity.
Considering the factors above, one could imagine the speech qualifying for
heightened protection: Who is speaking? The press release is issued by a
pharmaceutical manufacturer, a for-profit corporation. What is the content of
the speech? It addresses the scientific practices that supported a marketing
application for its particular product. When? It is released when the company
was no longer marketing the product and does not anticipate marketing it
again. Where? The press release targets the scientific community, via
academic publications. Why? The press release is intended to defend the
company's research practices in the public debate surrounding FDA's decision
to approve the product. How? It is published via a press release, rather than a
commercial advertisement.
This communication should qualify as fully protected noncommercial
speech, as all of the factors except for who perfectly align. But tweaking any
factor would likely jeopardize its noncommercial status. For example, how
much could the press release focus on the recalled product rather than the
company's research practices, if the ostensible goal is to defend the company's
scientific integrity? What if the press release is sent to both scientific and lay
audiences? Or made available on its web site? What if the company implies
that its other products are safe?
As emphasized above, most of the factors boil down to why the company
is speaking. And a court might reasonably derive commercial intent from even
minor clues, for example, by concluding that disseminating the press release
'9 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2004); William Vodra,
Nathan Cortez & David Korn, The Food and Drug Administration's Evolving Regulation of
Press Releases: Limits and Challenges, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 623, 631 (2008) (explaining
FDA's history of notifying parties in Warning Letters that press releases qualified under the
definitions of promotional labeling and advertising in 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1), which are "labeling"
under the Act).
200 Vodra, supra note 199, at 629-30 (noting that FDA sent its first letter in 1982, and
sent forty such letters between 1996 and 2001). Of course, FDA's jurisdiction over "labeling"
does not automatically extend to all materials distributed by companies that refer to a
particular product. Elsewhere, my coauthors and I have identified materials that would
probably not be subject to FDA jurisdiction, such as materials intended for investors to meet
securities law disclosure obligations, and materials provided to regulators or legislators. Id. at
633-34.
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to physician publications is a way of assuring potential prescribers that the
company's other products are safe. Given the industry's history of using
creative and aggressive promotional techniques, courts might be skeptical
enough to allow a hint of commercial intent to overpower several indications
suggesting otherwise. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court declined an
opportunity to clarify some of these points when it passed on Nike v. Kasky.201
Another distinction-blurring form of speech is the video news release
(VNR), a ready-made news segment produced or sponsored by drug
manufacturers and sent to news channels. In the early 1990s, FDA sent a
letter to the drug industry about VNRs, stating that "public relations materials
that promote drug products and that are issued by or on behalf of those who
market the drugs are . . . subject to the requirements of the Act."20 2 The FDA
recognized that a VNR could be a cleverly disguised promotion if it "makes
any representation or suggestion related to the use of an identifiable drug
product (whether or not the drug product or its sponsor is explicitly
named)."2 03 Although Professor Stern refers to restrictions on this type of
"camouflaged promotion" as existing only "in the realm of improbable
speculation," the FDA has initiated enforcement actions against VNRs and
other forms of publicity manipulated by companies.20' Although some VNRs
can be blatantly promotional, it is not difficult to imagine variations that are
not. But again, the factors would have to align almost perfectly for most courts
to consider a VNR to be noncommercial speech.
A third example of distinction-blurring speech is speech communicated
through ostensibly noncommercial activities, like charitable programs. Most
major drug companies operate patient assistance programs (PAPs) that
provide free or significantly discounted drugs to patients of limited means.205
Programs funded or sponsored by a single pharmaceutical firm might be a
tempting venue for camouflaged promotion.
For example, could a company, under the guise of enrolling patients in its
PAP, make claims that would draw FDA's ire? The Supreme Court has
considered a series of cases involving mixed speech by charities soliciting
contributions.2 06 Although these cases focus on laws that limit the act of
soliciting donations, the Court has held that such speech can be "fully
protected speech"2 07 after examining the circumstances in which it occurs.20 s
201 Nike v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
202 FDA Industry-Wide Letter: VNRs and PR Materials, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder]
Food Drug Cosm. Law Rep. (CCH) 42484 (Jul. 24, 1991). FDA suggested that it would
republish a new version of this letter as guidance document but never did so. Prescription
Drug Advertising and Promotional Labeling; Development and Use of FDA Guidance
Documents; Request for Comment, 62 Fed. Reg. 14,915 (Mar. 28, 1997).2 0 3 FDA Industry-Wide Letter: VNRs and PR Materials, supra note 202, 42484.
20 See, e.g., Regulatory Letter from FDA to ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Mar. 24, 1986) (on
file with author) (objecting to a VNR by ICN discussing possible uses of its drug Virazole in
treating AIDS-related diseases). For a general discussion of how FDA has asserted jurisdiction
over press releases by regulated firms, see Vodra, supra note 199.
205 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Notice,
Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare
Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,624 (Nov. 22, 2005).
206 See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Sec'y of
State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).2 0 7 Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
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But the government is hyper-skeptical of drug promotion, and suspects that
even these charitable programs are driven by the economic motivation to
induce future prescriptions.2 0 9 Again, the factors above would have to align
almost perfectly to overcome the skepticism that would lead most courts to
categorize even this speech as commercial.
Of course, the speech that consistently confounds FDA is speech about
unapproved, off-label uses. FDA regulations try to draw the line between
illegal promotion and legitimate scientific discussion here: FDA's advertising
rules prohibit manufacturers from suggesting any unapproved uses for
approved products;2 10 but the Agency's investigational drug rules state that
while manufacturers may not promote unapproved drugs, they may engage in
"the full exchange of scientific information . . . including dissemination of
scientific findings in scientific or lay media."2"' Although the first rule refers to
approved drugs and the second to investigational ones, the two approaches
reveal how the FDA distinguishes legitimate scientific speech from illegal
promotion.
Interestingly, the FDA's problem has not been drawing the line between
commercial and noncommercial speech, but in regulating commercial speech
without violating Central Hudson. The FDA's past attempts to guide industry
practices,212 and later to codify these policies,2"' resulted in several high-profile
decisions against the agency.214 At the end of one case, an exasperated court
said that "[a]fter six years' worth of briefs, motions, opinions, Congressional
208 Stern, supra note 19, at 90-91.
209 Recently, many pharmaceutical manufacturers crafted PAPs to help cover out-of-
pocket expenses borne by Medicare beneficiaries enrolling in Medicare's prescription drug
benefit, which took effect in 2006. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified and amended in
various sections of 42 U.S.C.). Before the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010,
the Medicare Part D benefit required beneficiaries to bear the full cost of drug expenses
between roughly $2,700 and $4,350, known as the "coverage gap" or "doughnut hole." Even
though Medicare subsidized the cost-sharing obligations for many low-income beneficiaries,
42 C.F.R. § 423.782 (2010), pharmaceutical companies wanted to design PAPs for
beneficiaries not eligible for these subsidies. Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D
Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. at 70,624. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Office
of Inspector General (HHS OIG) expressed concern that PAPs sponsored by drug companies
would induce higher drug spending, potentially in violation of federal fraud and abuse laws, by
steering enrollees to use particular drugs, increasing costs to Medicare, creating an advantage
over competing drugs, and reducing enrollee's incentives to use less expensive, but equally
effective drugs. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Office of Inspector Gen., OIG Advisory
Opinion 07-04, 7, Mar. 30, 2007, available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2007/AdvOpnO7-04.pdf.
210 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4) (2010).
211 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(a) (2010).
212 Draft Policy Statement on Industry Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 57
Fed. Reg. 56,412, 56,412-14 (Nov. 27, 1992); Guidance for Industry: Industry-Supported
Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,093, 64,093-100 (Dec. 3, 1997);
Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct. 8, 1996).
213 Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, § 401, 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-1 (repealed
2006); 21 C.F.R. § 99 (2010); Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for
Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Devices, 63 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (Nov. 20, 1998).
214 See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 128 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2000); Wash. Legal
Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 36 F.
Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999); Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998);
Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1995).
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acts, and more opinions, the issue remains 100% unresolved, and the
country's drug manufacturers are still without clear guidance as to their
permissible conduct."215 Since then, major drug companies have paid billions
to settle claims relating to allegations of off-label promotion.216
During this time, the FDA tried to provide much-needed guidance by
proposing and finalizing a Guidance for Good Reprint Practices, encouraging
drug and device firms to disseminate reprints discussing off-label uses only
when taking certain precautions.217 The Draft Guidance drew some media
scrutiny21s and generated a scornful letter from Congressman Waxman, who
said it "would carve a large loophole in the law and create a pathway by which
drug and device manufacturers can promote unapproved (off-label) uses of
their products. . . ."219
The Guidance is a clear attempt by the FDA to limit commercial uses of
such information, and as such, might be interpreted as encapsulating FDA's
criteria for distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech. For
example, the Guidance encourages companies to disseminate only
independent, peer-reviewed scientific or medical journal articles, not special
supplements or other materials funded, edited, or influenced by
manufacturers. 220 Reprints should be unabridged and "not be marked,
highlighted, summarized, or characterized by the manufacturer in any way. "221
And companies should distribute reprints "separately from information that is
promotional in nature," meaning sales representatives should not discuss
them, and they "should not be distributed in promotional exhibit halls or
during promotional speakers' programs." 22 2  However, they "may be
distributed at medical or scientific conferences in settings appropriate for
scientific exchange. "223
Thus, the Guidance attempts to render these documents as
noncommercial as possible, perhaps following the holdings of cases like
Consolidated Edison and Pacific Gas & Electric, in which the Court struck
down restrictions on political statements made separately from commercial
21s Henney, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
216 The stakes for companies go far beyond liability under the FDCA. For example,
companies have paid billions to settle civil and criminal claims alleging violations of the False
Claims Act, anti-kickback statute, and other laws for off-label and other forms of promotion.
For a concise citation of recent cases, see John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A
Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE
J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 299, 302 n.3 (2010).
217 Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Office of the Comm'r, Guidance for Industry: Good
Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific
Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses ofApproved Drugs and Approved or Cleared
Medical Devices, Jan. 2009, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/op/goodreprint.html.
2. See, e.g., Christopher Lee, FDA Considers Easing Curbs on Drug Makers, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 2007 at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/11/30/AR20071130023oo.html.
'19 Letter from Representative Henry A. Waxman, Chairman of the House Comm. on
Oversight and Gov't Reform, to Honorable Andrew von Eschenbach, Comm'r of the Food &
Drug Admin., (Nov. 30, 2007) available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/waxmanletter113007.pdf.
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speech.22 4 As long as the document is clearly separate from commercial items
and directly addresses an issue of public concern, it deserves heightened
protection.
Nevertheless, every court considering off-label speech has treated it as
commercial.' Again, the factors would have to align almost perfectly for
skeptical courts to consider speech by an FDA-regulated firm to be
noncommercial.
VII. CONCLUSION
The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
determines the extent to which the government can regulate it, if at all. The
distinction arose somewhat inauspiciously, but evolved into a fault line for
regulators like the FDA, whose core regulatory schemes frequently depend on
articulating what firms may and may not say. A review of relevant Supreme
Court decisions and lower court opinions involving FDA-regulated firms
reveals that the three-part test in Bolger really asks more than three questions.
Nevertheless, these questions generally try to ascertain whether the speech is
commercially motivated. Moreover, the most frequently used proxy for
commercial intent is whether the speaker is a commercial entity. All of which
raises the question: Can speech by FDA-regulated firms ever be
noncommercial?
The short answer, of course, is yes. But in FDA contexts, courts have been
exceedingly skeptical of speech by regulated firms -particularly drug and
device manufacturers-eager to find hidden commercial motivations. Thus,
even speech that truly blurs the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial will be subject to commercial standards unless the relevant
factors align almost perfectly-even a hint of commercial intent may eclipse
several indicia of noncommercial speech. This may be the price to pay for
decades of aggressive, perhaps even manipulative, marketing and promotional
techniques. Nevertheless, given all the possible permutations of speech by
FDA-regulated industries, and all the potential responses by the FDA, this
issue will recur.
224 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S.
1, 20 (1986) (plurality) (rejecting requirement that Pacific Gas & Electric must include
statements by those with alternative viewpoints in utility bills).
225 Hall & Sobotka, supra note 79, at 13.
